Mathew D. McCubbins

Mathew D. McCubbins

Ruth F. DeVarney Professor of Political Science in Trinity College of Arts and Sciences

External Address: 
Duke Law School 210 Science Dr, Duke Box 90362, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Duke Law School, Duke Box 90362, Durham, NC 27708
Phone: 
(919) 613-7006
Specialties: 
Political Economy

McCubbins is perhaps best known for the argument that legislative majorities, whether they be the dominant legislative party or a coalition parties governments (even supported minority coalitions) usurp the power resident in the legislature for their own purposes. Within busy legislatures, legislation is controlled as a consequence of a party or coalition of parties capturing control of key legislative assets, such as congressional committee in the US Congress, which because of the rules have blocking (or veto power) and thus serve as a gateway (or gate) to discussion of a bill by the full plenum. The legislative process is replete with gates that are both subtle and gross. All other powers to set the agenda arise as a consequence of creating and controlling the legislative process.

Education

  • Ph.D., California Institute of Technology 1983

McCubbins, M. "Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle." The Handbook of the New Institutional Economics. 2005. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "Agenda Power in the US House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986." Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Stanford University Press, 2002. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, Campbell, A, and Cox, G. "Agenda Power in the US Senate, 1877 to 1986." Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Stanford University Press, 2002. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, and Lupia, A. "The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence." Elements of Reason: Coginition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. 2000. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, Lupia, A, and Popkin, S. "Constructing a Theory of Reasoning." Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. 2000. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, Lupia, A, and Popkin, S. "Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics." Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. 2000. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, and Haggard, S. "Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy." Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 1-. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "The Institutional Determinants of Public Policy." Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 21-. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, and Heller, W. "Political Institutions and Economic Development: The Case of Electric Utility Regulation in Argentina and Chile." Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 229-. (Chapter)

McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2000. (Chapter)

Pages

McCubbins, M, and Rodriguez, D. "Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory." Yale Law Journal Online 120 (2011): 387-.

Cox, GW, Kousser, T, and McCubbins, MD. "Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures." The Journal of Politics 72.3 (July 2010): 799-811. Full Text

Boudreau, C, and McCubbins, MD. "The Blind Leading the Blind: Who Gets Polling Information and Does it Improve Decisions?." The Journal of Politics 72.2 (April 2010): 513-527. Full Text

McCubbins, M, and McCubbins, C. "Proposition 13 and the California Fiscal Shell Game." California Journal of Politics and Policy 2 (2010).

McCubbins, M, and Boudreau, C. "The Blind Leading the Blind: Who Gets Polling Information and Does It Improve Decisions?." Journal of Politics 72 (2010): 1-15.

McCubbins, M, Rodriguez, D, and Weingast, B. "The Rule of Law Unplugged." Emory Law Journal 59 (2010): 1455-1494.

McCubbins, M, Cox, G, and Kousser, T. "Party Power or Preferences?: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures." Journal of Politics 72 (2010): 1-13.

Pages