Mathew D. McCubbins
Ruth F. DeVarney Professor of Political Science in Trinity College of Arts and Sciences
McCubbins is perhaps best known for the argument that legislative majorities, whether they be the dominant legislative party or a coalition parties governments (even supported minority coalitions) usurp the power resident in the legislature for their own purposes. Within busy legislatures, legislation is controlled as a consequence of a party or coalition of parties capturing control of key legislative assets, such as congressional committee in the US Congress, which because of the rules have blocking (or veto power) and thus serve as a gateway (or gate) to discussion of a bill by the full plenum. The legislative process is replete with gates that are both subtle and gross. All other powers to set the agenda arise as a consequence of creating and controlling the legislative process.
- Ph.D., California Institute of Technology 1983
McCubbins, M. "Putting the State Back into State Government: The Constitution and the Budget." Constitutional Reform in California: Making State Government More Effective and Responsive. Institute of Governmental Studies, 1995. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Introduction." Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Cambridge University Press, 1995. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Conclusion." Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Cambridge University Press, 1995. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives." Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Party Decline and Presidential Campaigns in the Television Age." Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era. Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992. 9-58. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Introduction." Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 1992. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Conclusion." Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era. Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits." The Politics of Economic Policy in The U.S. and Japan. Brookings Institution, 1991. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M. "Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Control and Fiscal Stalemate." Politics and Economics in the Eighties. University of Chicago Press, 1991. 83-122. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits Under Divided Government." Politics of Divided Government. 1991. (Chapter)
McCubbins, M, Cox, G, and Heller, W. "Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000." Legislative Studies Quarterly 33 (2008): 171-198.
McCubbins, M, and Garrett, E. "When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities." Public Works Management and Policy 13 (2008): 39-61.
McCubbins, M, Kousser, T, and Moule, E. "For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?." State Politics and Policy Quarterly 8 (2008): 331-361.
McCubbins, M, and Boudreau, C. "Nothing But the Truth? Experiments on Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 5 (2008): 751-789.
McCubbins, M, Noll, R, Weingast, B, and Rodriguez, D. "Administrative Law Agonistes." Columbia Law Review Sidebar 108 (2008): 15-22.
McCubbins, M, and Brody, D. "Afterword." (2007).
McCubbins, M, and Garrett, E. "The Dual Path Initiative Framework." Southern California Law Review 80 (2007): 299-346.
McCubbins, M, Boudreau, C, Lupia, A, and Rodriguez, D. "What Statutes Mean: Lesson From Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation." San Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 957-992.
McCubbins, M, and Barrett, C. "Revisiting the Links Between Governance and Biodiversity Loss." Conservation Biology 21 (2007): 900-901.
McCubbins, M, Boudreau, C, and Rodriguez, D. "Statutory Interpretation and The Intentional(ist) Stance." Loyola Law Review 38 (2006): 2131-2146.