Mathew D. McCubbins
Ruth F. DeVarney Professor of Political Science in Trinity College of Arts and Sciences
McCubbins is perhaps best known for the argument that legislative majorities, whether they be the dominant legislative party or a coalition parties governments (even supported minority coalitions) usurp the power resident in the legislature for their own purposes. Within busy legislatures, legislation is controlled as a consequence of a party or coalition of parties capturing control of key legislative assets, such as congressional committee in the US Congress, which because of the rules have blocking (or veto power) and thus serve as a gateway (or gate) to discussion of a bill by the full plenum. The legislative process is replete with gates that are both subtle and gross. All other powers to set the agenda arise as a consequence of creating and controlling the legislative process.
- Ph.D., California Institute of Technology 1983
McCubbins, M, Gerber, E, and Lupia, A. "When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement." Journal of Politics 66 (2004): 43-68.
McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "Theories of Legislative Organizations." American Political Science Association - Comparative Politics Newsletter (2004).
McCubbins, M, Neto, O, and Cox, G. "Agenda Power in Brazil's Comara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998." World Politics 55 (2003).
McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "A Pracis on Legislative Leadership." Extensions: Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center (2003).
McCubbins, M, and Lupia, A. "A Response to Austen-Smith." Public Choice 106 (2001): 183-189.
LUPIA, A, and MCCUBBINS, MD. "Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed." European Journal of Political Research 37.3 (May 2000): 291-307. Full Text
McCubbins, M, Cox, G, and Masuyama, M. "Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives." Japanese Journal of Political Science 1 (2000): 1-21.
McCubbins, M. "The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act." Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 15 (1999): 180-217.
McCubbins, M, and Lupia, A. "Representation or Abdication: How Citizens Use Institutions to Make Their Agents Accountable." European Journal of Political Research 37 (1999): 291-307.
McCubbins, M. "Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma." Regulation 22 (1999): 30-37.