Mathew D. McCubbins
Ruth F. DeVarney Professor of Political Science in Trinity College of Arts and Sciences
McCubbins is perhaps best known for the argument that legislative majorities, whether they be the dominant legislative party or a coalition parties governments (even supported minority coalitions) usurp the power resident in the legislature for their own purposes. Within busy legislatures, legislation is controlled as a consequence of a party or coalition of parties capturing control of key legislative assets, such as congressional committee in the US Congress, which because of the rules have blocking (or veto power) and thus serve as a gateway (or gate) to discussion of a bill by the full plenum. The legislative process is replete with gates that are both subtle and gross. All other powers to set the agenda arise as a consequence of creating and controlling the legislative process.
- Ph.D., California Institute of Technology 1983
McCubbins, M, and Lupia, A. "Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making." Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (1994): 361-384.
McCubbins, M. "Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation." Georgetown Law Journal 80 (1992): 705-742.
McCubbins, M, and Cox, G. "On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly 16 (1991): 547-570.
McCubbins, M. "The Theory of Interpretive Canon and Legislative Behavior." International Law and Economics Review 12 (1991): 235-238.
McCubbins, M, Noll, R, and Weingast, B. "Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures." Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 6 (1990): 307-332.
McCubbins, M. "Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy." Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 6 (1990): 203-212.
McCubbins, M. "Budget Policy-making and the Appearance of Power." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations 6 (1990): 133-153.
McCubbins, M. "Book Review." American Political Science Review (1990): 302-304. (Review)
McCubbins, M, Calvert, R, and Weingast, B. "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion." American Journal of Political Science 33 (1989): 588-611.
McCubbins, M, and Kiewiet, D. "Parties, Committees, and Policymaking in the U.S. Congress: A Comment on the Role of Transaction Costs as Determinants of the Governance Structure of Political Institutions." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145 (1989): 676-685.