The Coevolution of Networks of Interstate Support, Interstate Threat, and Civil War

Interstate and intrastate conflicts are nested in broader networks of rivalry and cooperation and can be modeled as such. An intergroup security dilemma logic points to trade-offs states face as they cultivate “support groups”—receiving security assistance has the potential to attract aggression and subversion from other states. Hypotheses from this logic are evaluated using stochastic actor-oriented models treating support ties, interstate threat ties, and intrastate conflict as mutually constitutive. The results show that support groups with high military capacity but low levels of interest congruence are associated with higher propensities for interstate threat and intrastate conflict. Support groups with both high levels of interest congruence and high military capacity do not experience an increase in propensity for interstate threat or intrastate conflict. A novel finding emerges: the same types of support relationships that are associated with interstate threats also are associated with intrastate conflict.